The Limits of Criminal Responsibility in Light of Maqāṣid-Based Jurisprudence

حدود المسؤولية الجنائية

Abstract

This study addresses the problem of the limits of criminal responsibility in light of the maqāṣid-based approach, proceeding from the premise that responsibility is not merely a formal legal link between the act and the punishment, but rather a moral-legislative judgment conditioned by the availability of freedom, capacity, and intent, as well as by consideration of the human and social context of the criminal act. The research demonstrates that the expansion of the attribution of responsibility on the basis of abstract conceptions of the criminal actor has led to the weakening of punitive justice and the transformation of punishment into an instrument of social control rather than a means of achieving fairness..

The study further shows that the philosophical foundation of criminal responsibility rests on the assumption of the capacity for free choice, and that any fundamental impairment of this capacity—whether due to coercion, necessity, diminished cognition, or structural pressures—undermines the moral entitlement to punishment. It also highlights the ability of the maqāṣid-based approach to regulate this problem through inherent normative constraints, foremost among them the consideration of actual capacity, the precise assessment of intent and mens rea, and attention to consequences and personal circumstances, thereby achieving a balance between the protection of public order and the safeguarding of human dignity. 

The study concludes that reconstructing criminal responsibility on a maqāṣid-based foundation requires a shift from a logic of abstract deterrence to one of reform and differentiated justice, thus reconnecting law with ethical values and restoring the legitimacy of punishment as an instrument for realizing justice rather than a means of domination.